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FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION
SUITS: MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTABILITY
ROSALIE LEVINSON*
The last twenty-five years have witnessed an enormous prolifera-
tion of litigation involving government power to punish employees
for engaging in arguably protected first amendment activity.' A basic
tension exists between the government's right to operate effectively
and efficiently and the employee's right to enjoy the same first
amendment freedoms of other citizens.' In addition, the public's in-
terest in receiving employees' communications regarding the opera-
tion of government is often at stake.3 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has sent conflicting signals to the lower courts as to how such
tension should be resolved, resulting in much confusion as to which
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A., M.A.,
Indiana University; J.D.. Valparaiso University.
1, See infra text accompanying notes 38-65.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 16-18.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 64-75. Several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have recognized that the first amendment protects not only the right to speak
but also the corollary right to receive information. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists...
the protection is afforded to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive. . . ."). This right to receive information has been viewed as especially criti-
cal where the speech concerns misconduct by government officials. See Blasi, The
Checking Value in Firs Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521,
558 (arguing that this speech "be accorded a level of constitutional protection higher
than that given any other type of communication").
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precedent should control, what standards to utilize, and how to allo-
cate burdens of proof between the parties.4
Although the case law has involved employees at all levels of gov-
ernment employment, this article explores the issue at the municipal
level. Recent Supreme Court decisions permitting suits against mu-
nicipalities for civil rights violations have opened a critical avenue of
relief to the government employee allegedly retaliated against for
having engaged in protected speech.5 These decisions, however,
leave unresolved several questions regarding municipal liability,
which are particularly troublesome in the context of retaliation suits.
The Supreme Court has held that municipalities may be liable only
for their official policies or customs.6 Since a great majority of em-
ployment decisions are not based on an officially adopted policy and
courts have not yet established a definition of "custom," the question
of municipal accountability remains uncertain.7 Finally, even as-
suming government liability, the question of assessing the value of
first amendment rights in order to grant appropriate and effective
damages has proved to be especially problematic.8
This article provides an analytic framework for resolving these
critical issues that arise in litigating first amendment retaliation suits.
First the legal issues involving the first amendment are explored.
Then the question of municipal accountability for employee deci-
sions is analyzed. Finally, the damage issue is clarified.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS PROTECTING THE SPEECH OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
The notion that government may not retaliate against its employ-
ees for engaging in first amendment activities has evolved only dur-
ing the past twenty-five years. In earlier times, courts universally
held that government employees had no such rights. In his classic
articulation of the "right-privilege distinction," Justice Holmes in
McAulff v. Mayor of New Bedford9 stated that "the petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 16-45.
5. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980); Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
6. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 662, 690-95 (1978).
7. See infra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 150-204.
9. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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tional right to be a policeman." ' I° Holmes went on to explain that
government employees take their employment on the terms that are
offered to them." The United States Supreme Court still espoused
this view as late as 1952 in the case ofAdler v. Board of Education,12
which upheld a provision of the New York Civil Service Law dis-
qualifying from the civil service and public school system any person
who "advocates, advises or teaches" governmental overthrow by
force or violence or who organizes or joins any group advocating
such doctrine. 3 The Court reasoned that public school teachers have
the right to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will, but they
have no right to work for the state and the school system on their own
terms.' 4 In short, the state has the right and duty to screen teachers
as to their fitness in order to maintain the integrity of the schools as
part of an ordered society. 5
It was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court declared that govern-
ment cannot condition employment on relinquishing first amend-
ment rights. 6 The Court subsequently clarified its position in
Pickering v. Board of Education,'7 finding that a public school
teacher could not be dismissed for writing a letter to a local newspa-
per criticizing the School Board's allocation. of funds. Justice Mar-
shall characterized the problem as requiring a balance "between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro-
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."' 8 He specifically refused to set down a general standard,
but noted that the dispute implicated no question of maintaining dis-
cipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers.' 9 In addition,
10. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. For a discussion of the development and eventual
decline of the "right-privilege" distinction, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
11. 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 518.
12. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
13. Id. at 487-88 n.3.
14. Id. at 492.
15. Id.
16. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("the theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected").
17. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
18. Id. at 568.
19. Id. at 570.
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:3
the employee's speech concerned an issue of "legitimate public con-
cern," requiring free and open debate.20
Justice Marshall thus suggested that the government cannot penal-
ize its employees for making even false, negligent statements about
matters of public concern unless it can demonstrate an overriding in-
terest, for example, the need for strict confidentiality or for preserva-
tion of harmony in the work place.2 The latter concerns developed
into the so-called "Pickering defense" to first amendment retaliation
suits-a defense that the government has had to raise and prove.22 In
addition, Marshall noted in dicta that an employee whose statements
were entirely without foundation so as to evidence his general incom-
petence would not be protected by the first amendment.23 In essence,
the dismissal under these circumstances would then be for reasons
other than protected speech.
The Supreme Court elaborated on the Pickering analysis in its next
major retaliation case, Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle.24 A
school teacher claimed that the Board refused to renew his contract
because he had exercised first amendment rights. Doyle, however,
had engaged in several questionable incidents not involving pro-
tected speech, that is, he argued with other teachers and staff and
20. Id. at 571-72.
21. Id. at 572-73.
22. The Court in Pickering suggested that the government had to prove the re-
striction was necessary to prevent actual impairment of the efficient operation of the
services it performs as an employer. 391 U.S. at 568-73. Then the court was to bal-
ance the government's interests against countervailing first amendment interests. Id.
at 568, 573. Courts of appeals read the decision as requiring defendant to raise and
establish the unprotected character of the employee's speech. See, e.g., Columbus
Educ. Ass'n v. Columbus City School Dist., 623 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (de-
fendant carries the burden of proving that its interest in the efficient administration of
education outweighs the plaintiffs free speech rights); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1976) (the state must be able to show that the prohibited conduct would
materially and substantially interfere with the operation of the school); Smith v.
United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974) (in order for the government to con-
stitutionally remove an employee from government service for exercising his first
amendment rights, it must "clearly demonstrate that the employee's conduct substan-
tially and materially interferes with the discharge of duties and responsibilities in
such employment"); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir. 1973) ("the defense
must assume the burden of showing that the plaintiff's acts materially and substan-
tially interfered with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school").
23. 391 U.S. at 573 n.5.
24. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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made obscene gestures to girls in the cafeteria.25 The alleged pro-
tected incident involved Doyle's telephone call to a disc jockey at a
radio station regarding a newly adopted teacher dress-code. The ter-
mination letter informed Doyle that the basis for the dismissal was
his lack of tact in handling professional matters.26 Specific references
were made to both the radio station incident and to the obscene ges-
ture incident. The district court found that the first amendment
clearly protected the telephone call to the radio station, and that since
it played a substantial part in the decision of the Board not to renew
Doyle's employment, he was entitled to reinstatement with back
pay.27 The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion.2 8
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the lower court's finding
that the speech was constitutionally protected.29 It cited Pickering,
noting that there was "no suggestion by the Board that Doyle vio-
lated any established policy, or that the Board's reaction to his com-
munication to the radio station was anything more than an ad hoc
response to Doyle's action making the memorandum public."30
Since the record was unclear, however, as to whether the school
board would have failed to renew Doyle's contract in the absence of
the radio station incident, the Supreme Court felt it was necessary to
remand for further proceedings. The Court established the following
standard for consideration upon remand:
1. Initially the plaintiff bears the burden to show both that his
conduct was constitutionally protected and that such con-
duct was a substantial or a motivating factor in the Board's
decision not to rehire him.?
2. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision as to plaintiffs reemployment even in the ab-
25. Id. at 281-82.
26. Id. at 282-83.
27. Id. at 283.
28. 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975).
29. 429 U.S. at 284.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 287. Note that this "bad motive" standard was heavily criticized by
Professor Thomas Emerson as placing too heavy a burden on one deprived of first
amendment rights. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. RaV. 422, 470 (1980). Provided courts adopt the prima facie case analysis
suggested in this article, infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text, the burden is not
an unreasonable one.
1983]
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sence of the protected conduct.32
The decision thus adds a new defense to a retaliation suit. Even if the
plaintiff survives Pickering, because the government fails to prove an
overriding interest in suppressing the employee's speech, he may still
lose his case if the government can establish that it would have made
the same employment decision even absent the protected conduct.
This analysis is reflected in the Supreme Court's subsequent deci-
sion of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School."3 The Court ini-
tially looked to Pickering to establish that the communication was
protected by the Constitution. It stated that the school had no greater
interest in limiting a teacher's contribution to public debate than a
similar contribution by any member of the general public.34 As in
Pickering, the Court suggested that the agency's institutional effi-
ciency might be threatened when an employee personally confronted
his superior.35 But in this case, such was not at stake. The Court
went on, however, to remand in light of the intervening Mt. Healthy
decision in order to give the school the opportunity to establish that it
would have made the same decision not to rehire even without the
protected conduct.3 6 Although the Court of Appeals had rejected this
defense, the Supreme Court found that the issue should be heard by
the trial court.37
The appellate courts have adopted divergent views as to the resolu-
tion of employee retaliation suits, reflecting disagreement regarding
the proper application of the Pickering and M. Healthy standards. 8
32. 429 U.S. at 287.
33. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id. at 415 n.4.
36. Id. at 417.
37. Id.
38. The confusion among the circuits is noted in Wren v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1277,
1285 (7th Cir. 1980). The court there applies M. Healthy analysis, but then notes that
the same result would be reached under Picketing. .1d. at 1286. It makes reference to
two conflicting appellate court decisions, Ze., Janusaitus v. Middlebury Volunteer
Fire Dep't., 607 F.2d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the court held that Pickering and
not Mt. Healthy should be used to resolve an employee dismissal dispute, and Rosaly
v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1979), in which the court relied solely on Mt.
Healthy in a similar case. Other courts have also ignored the Pickering balancing
approach. See, e.g., Selzer v. Fleisher, 629 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1980) (the majority ap-
plied the Mt. Healthy test without mentioning Pickering, which the concurrence cited
as improper); Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980) (no need to
submit a Pickering issue to the jury), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981). Other courts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/3
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The Supreme Court's cursory references to Pickering in its most re-
cent retaliation cases suggests the continued vitality of the earlier rul-
ing, 9 but it is unclear when and how the balancing of interests is to
occur. As noted previously, after Pickering many lower courts im-
posed the burden on the defendant to raise the "Pickering defense."'' 4
The Supreme Court's statement in Mt. Healthy that the plaintiff ini-
tially carries the burden "to show that his conduct was constitution-
ally protected"'" should not be interpreted as having altered the
government's burden. In Mt. Healthy, the Court cited Pickering and
then summarily concluded that plaintifl's speech was clearly pro-
tected.42 Some federal courts have erroneously read the decision to
impose on the plaintiff the burden of proving the protected nature of
his activity in order to survive summary judgment for the defend-
ant.43 Other courts, while noting that the burden rests with the plain-
tiff, have proceeded to assume the speech to be protected 44 in order to
first consider a Mt. Healthy defense. Still others have avoided the
issue, simply stating that the court must initially decide whether the
have utilized a three-prong analysis, combining Mt. Healthy and Pickering to require
plaintiffs to establish the protected nature of the speech, and that the speech was a
motivating factor, then shifting the burden to the defendant to show he would have
made the same decision even without the protected activity. See, e.g., Wilson v. Tay-
lor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1981);
Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1980).
There is also confusion as to who should do the balancing, ie., judge or jury, and at
what point the balancing should be done. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
Note also that several courts have pointed out the inappropriateness of granting sum-
mary judgement to defendants in cases where a Pickering balance is required. See,
e.g., Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981); Nathanson v.
United States, 630 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1980).
39. See supra text accompanying note 30 for a discussion of Mt. Healthy. See also
supra text accompanying note 37 for a discussion of Givhan.
40. See supra note 22.
41. 429 U.S. at 284.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
speech was not a matter of public concern and thus unprotected); Correa v. Nampa
School Dist., 645 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding dismissal based on plaintiffs
failure to establish that the conduct was constitutionally protected); Foster v. Ripley,
645 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding summary judgment for defendant because
employee failed to establish the speech was constitutionally protected); Endicott v.
Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming district court's judgment n.o.v.
based on plaintiffs failure to establish that the speech was protected).
44. See infra note 49.
1983]
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first amendment protects the speech.45
In order to safeguard the vital first amendment freedoms at stake,
while at the same time recognizing government interests, the plaintiff
should initially carry the burden of establishing only: 1) that he en-
gaged in speech or conduct that is "arguably" protected because the
speech or conduct falls within the scope of the first amendment;4 6 and
2) that the first amendment incident was a motivating factor in the
alleged retaliatory action. This analysis comports with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Mt. Healthy and Pickering decisions.47 It
requires the plaintiff to present a prima facie case without relieving
the state of its usual obligation to justify the suppression of speech
with compelling reasons.48 Furthermore, by imposing upon the
plaintiff only the burden of showing that his speech is arguably pro-
tected by the first amendment, a difficult constitutional balance may
be avoided in all instances in which the government relies on a Mt.
Healthy defense, that is, where it can prove that the speech incident,
even if protected, was not crucial to its employment decision.49
45. See, e.g., Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981); Wil-
liams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926
(1981); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. In the context of retaliation suits, this generally would require the employee to
establish that the retaliatory action had a chilling effect on the exercise of his first
amendment rights. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. Also note that in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
presented a "bona fide constitutional claim," precluding summary judgment, based
on simple allegations that non-retention resulted from his testimony before legislative
committees which was protected by the first amendment. Id. at 598.
47. Again note that although the Court in Mt. Healthy suggested that plaintiff
carry the burden of proving his speech to be protected, in reality it brushed over this
requirement. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Court in
Pickering suggested that the defendant carries the burden of proving that its interest
in efficient administration outweighs plaintiff's free speech. 391 U.S. at 568. See
supra note 22.
48. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
49. Several courts have recognized the importance of avoiding the constitutional
issue and have, therefore, assumed the protected nature of the speech, proceeding
oftentimes to conclude that the plaintiff had failed to establish that defendant's action
was retaliatory. See, e.g., McClure v. Cywinski, 686 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1982) (uphold-
ing ajudgement n.o.v. that a reasonable jury could not have found that the employee
would not have been discharged absent his assumed protected apolitical stance); Hil-
lis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1982) (lack of
cooperation, not speech, was the reason for dismissal and the plaintiff failed to show
that non-renewal of the contract was based on the exercise of first amendment rights);
Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 662 F.2d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 1981) (court assumed
speech was protected, but defendant proved plaintiff would have been denied tenure
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/3
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Assuming plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden would
shift to the defendants who could raise two possible affirmative de-
fenses.5" First, as previously noted, the defendant could rebut the
prima facie case by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision even without the alleged pro-
tected speech incident.5' For example, in Mt. Healthy the incidents
of impropriety having nothing to do with protected speech could be
utilized by the defendants to prove that the speech incident really was
not critical to its termination decision.5" Again, it should be recalled
even without the protected activity); Lindsey v. Mississippi Research and Dev.
Center, 652 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (plaintiff failed to establish
speech as a motivating factor); Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 510 (4th Cir. 1981)
(failure to recommend tenure was based on the need to reduce the number of faculty
members, not first amendment activity); Stone v. Board of Univ. Sys., 620 F.2d 526
(5th Cir. 1980) (denial of raise was based on valid school policy, not protected
speech); Dohne v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendants carried
their burden under Mt. Healthy of establishing that they would have made the same
decision even absent the protected conduct); Smith v. Price, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir.
1980) (other reasons for plaintiff's dismissal, including conduct which was prohibited
by valid rules and regulations, justified the defendant's action). Note that this ap-
proach of avoiding unnecessary constitutional issues comports with the well estab-
lished doctrine of necessity which Justice Brandeis discussed in Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also N.Y. Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-83 n.22 (1979); Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S.
549, 568-69 (1947). This precedent was specifically cited in Tanner v. McCall, 625
F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980) to justify its avoidance of the first amendment issue. Id. at
1190.
50. The significance of characterizing these defenses as affirmative defenses is
two-fold: First it requires the defendant to properly raise the issue or it will be
deemed waived. FIELD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 41 (4th Ed. 1978) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b), 8(c) to support this conclusion). See also Mitchell v. Williams, 420 F.2d 67 (8th
Cir. 1969); CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 97 (2d ed. 1947); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.9 (2d ed. 1977). Second, it is generally established that the
party with the burden of pleading also carries the burden of proof. CLARK, supra at
§ 607; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra at § 7.8; E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 75 (1956).
This allocation of burdens is further justified by the traditional rule that the burden
should rest with the party having greater access to the facts. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra at § 7.8; E. MORGAN, supra, at 75 n.98. In the case of retaliation suits, the
government is in a better position to establish that its operation demands the suppres-
sion of employees' speech. Also implicit in any analysis are considerations of policy
and fairness. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra, at § 7.8; Cleary, Presuming and Plead-
ing." An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11-12 (1959). Policy con-
cerns have long favored protection of vital first amendment concerns, again
supporting a requirement that the defendant carry the burden of justifying his actions.
51. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
52. Id. at 286-87.
19831
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that the Supreme Court's primary concern in Mt. Healthy was that an
employee not be permitted to insulate himself by simply engaging in
protected conduct.53
Alternatively, the defendant can argue that although the speech in-
cident was a motivating and critical factor in its decision, the speech
must give way to paramount state interests. 4 The nature of this sec-
ond defense requires further elaboration. Although in Pickering the
Court stated that it was a matter of balancing the first amendment
rights against the government concerns, the Court found that the gov-
ernment failed to assert any substantial interests.55 Thus the case
provides little guidance as to how to balance when valid claims are
raised by both parties. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, how-
ever, have recognized the critical weight that should be accorded first
amendment rights in our society.5 6 A close analysis of these decisions
suggests that the burden on the defendant should be to prove that the
restriction of speech is necessary to the achievement of some impor-
tant government interests, and that it cannot achieve its goal through
less drastic means. 7 Many Supreme Court cases have indicated that
the State cannot restrict the speech of its employees absent a compel-
53. Id. at 286. See also supra note 49 for cases in which defendants sustained this
burden.
54. The defendants were successful in establishing the unprotected nature of the
speech in several cases. See infra notes 61-62.
55. The Court basically concluded that the teacher's dismissal could not be sup-
ported by the government's interest as an employer. The school board had no factual
evidence that Pickering's speech had actually impaired the operation of the school
system, nor had it established that Pickering's public statements were detrimental to
the school system's interests. 391 U.S. at 570-71.
56. See infra notes 57-58.
57. One of the first cases imposing least drastic means analysis was Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) in which the Court struck down an Arkansas statute
compelling each teacher, as a condition of employment in a public school, to file
annually an affidavit listing every organization with which he or she had been affili-
ated within the previous five years. While recognizing the state's interest in investi-
gating the competence of prospective teachers, the Court was troubled by the over-
breadth of the requirement. Id. at 488. More recently in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 362 (1976), the Court indicated that employment cannot be conditioned on reli-
gious or political beliefs absent some vital government end and means which are least
restrictive in achieving that end. See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. Rv. 844 (1970); Comment, CIA and First Amendment, 82
COLUM. L. Rav. 662, 678-82 (1982) (citing lower court cases which have used least
drastic means analysis to uphold employee's speech); Comment, Less Drastic Means
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/3
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ling justification. 8
Drawing on this precedent, the Fifth Circuit has required proof
that "the regulation of speech was necessary to prevent a material
and substantial interference with the operation of the public depart-
ment."59 Other circuits similarly have required the government to
establish that the speech substantially disrupts the workplace, 60 or
that it demonstrates the employee's total incompetence or lack of
qualifications for the position,6' or that it completely undermines the
58. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S& 347, 362-63 (1976); Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976). Note the one
exception has been the Court decisions dealing with the government's right to limit
the employee's involvement in partisan political activities. See Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 n.23 (1977). United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947). Such restrictions have been upheld as remedial, noncen-
sorial provisions actually intended to further the first amendment rights of employees
by shielding them from being coerced into supporting their employers' political
campaigns.
59. Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1980). While Pickering
suggested that insubordination and disharmony are sufficient justification to curtail
speech. most lower courts have replaced these factors with a test requiring "material
and substantial disruption," based on the Court's language in Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
60. See, e.g., Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1981)
(the professor's speech in joining a picket line is protected unless it substantial, inter-
feres with school activity); Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880, 885 (10th Cir. 1981)
(performance and operational efficiency objections must be substantial and legitimate
before they, can serve as a basis for discipline or discharge of a public employee);
Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's criticism of the
department had no adverse effect on the efficiency of the public services performed);
Nathanson v. United States, 630 F.2d 1260, 1263 (8th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment
is permitted only where the uncontradicted facts show that plaintiff's expression hin-
dered the operation of the department); Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (employee's discharge cannot be upheld unless it impairs the employee's
ability to perform or interferes with the efficient operation of the agency); McGill v.
Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1979) (the employee's speech is protected
unless it is so disruptive as to impede the employee's performance or to interfere with
the operation of the government); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 117 (1st Cir.
1977) (plaintiffs criticism did not cause significant interference with the efficient oper-
ation of the department and was therefore protected).
61. This defense was first suggested by the Court in Pickering. See supra note 22
and accompanying text. Accord Anderson v. Evans, 660 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1981) (the
teacher's inflammatory remarks cast doubt on her judgment and competence as a
school teacher); Correa v. Nampa School Dist., 645 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (the court
affirmed the limitation on plaintiffs associational ties finding an impairment of plain-
tiff's ability to fulfill his job duties).
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effective working relationships with co-workers or superiors.62 Thus,
although the Court in Pickering suggested an ad hoc balancing in
assessing the protection to be afforded employee speech, many appel-
late courts have clearly imposed on the government the burden of
establishing that the restriction is necessary to prevent actual impair-
ment of the efficient operation it performs.63
Courts have been especially reluctant to suppress. employee speech
concerning the functioning of government.64 Several commentators
have noted the importance of the public's interest in discovering offi-
cial improprieties and government waste,65 a concern reflected in
62. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahi, 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981) (statements made to
the press regarding internal controversy disrupted the team and the program and
were thus unprotected); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs
activity was unprotected because it completely disrupted the working relationship of
the employees); Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs
letter threatened serious disruption of working relationship which required coopera-
tion and loyalty); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1979) (a fireman's verbal attack on persons with whom he had to function in the
closest coordination was unprotected); Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977) (public criticism of the district attorney by his
first assistant precluded any future working relationship between the parties and
hence was unprotected). Contra D'Andrea v. Adams, 626 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1980)
(stressing the Pickering concept that employees can disagree with administrators with-
out being subjected to retaliation, the court found that plaintiffs statements were not
so personal or of such an intimate nature as to undermine seriously the effectiveness
of the working relations).
63. An exception to the strict standard has been developed by some courts where
the speech of police or firemen is implicated. For example, in Wilson v. Taylor, 658
F.2d 1021, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981), the court noted that more deference may be given the
state interest in preserving the morals and integrity of police departments than in
other contexts. The same point was made regarding a volunteer fire department. See
Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979). Contra
Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926
(1981). The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's attempt to justify its action based
on the necessity of maintaining discipline in its police department, but Justice Rehn-
quist, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that the appellate court struck
the wrong balance. Id. at 928-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Several cases applying Pickering have explicitly considered the public's inter-
est in receiving employee's communication in determining whether the speech restric-
tion is valid. See, e.g., Allaire v. Rogers, 658 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1981); Foster v.
Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d
993, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981); Downing v. Williams, 624
F.2d 612, 624 (5th Cir. 1980); Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir.
1979); Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1976); Meehan v. Macy, 392
F.2d 822, 837 (D.C. Cir.), modFed, 425 F.2d 469 (1968), vacatedper curiam, 425 F.2d
472 (1969); Hoope v. City of Chester, 473 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
65. See Blasi, supra note 2; Comment, First Amendment Standards/or Subsequent
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Congress' recent passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.66
The central purpose of the Act is to provide increased protection for
"whistle-blowers," federal employees seeking to disclose wrongdoing
in the government. The Act specifically authorizes the Merit Systems
Protection Board to order "corrective action" by government agen-
cies whose officials have sought to retaliate against "whistle-blow-
ers." 67 The Supreme Court in Pickering stressed this same interest in
receiving communication from government employees who are
"most likely to have informed and definite opinions. 68
Many lower federal courts have relied upon this same factor in
upholding the first amendment rights of state or local government
employees. In Williams v. Board of Regents,69 the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the plaintiff was communicating a matter of public con-
cern, a critical factor in balancing the interest of the employee as a
citizen against the interest of the government: "When the matter is as
important to the public as that involved here, the employee's right to
speak must be vigorously protected if the public is to be informed."7
The case involved falsification of an official document by one official
for the protection of another official. The court viewed this as a grave
miscarriage of the public trust and concluded that the trial court did
not err in balancing in favor of protection of the first amendment
rights and in refusing to even submit the issue to the jury.7 1 The
Pumshment of Dissemination of Confidential Government Information, 68 CALIF. L.
REv. 83, 90 (1980). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (stressing the importance of assuring public employees of their right to
"inform the public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors").
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (Supp. III 1979).
67. Id. at § 2301(b)(9). Congress intended these provisions to encourage employ-
ees to disclose agency wrongdoings and abuse by eliminating the prospect of
prejudice to their careers. S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22. The Act details a
list of prohibited personnel practices, including appointment, promotion, transfer, re-
employment, performance evaluation, decisions with regard to paid benefits, awards,
etc 5 U.SC. § 2302(b).
68. 391 U.S. at 572. The Court went on to note that when the subject matter of
the communication pertains to the operation of government services, the public's in-
terest was particularly strong because it lies at "the core value of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at 573. At least a plurality of the Supreme
Court has similarly adopted the view that some areas of human concern are more
important for first amendment purposes than others, and that political speech is
thought to rank very high. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981).
70. Id. at 1003.
71. Id.
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appellate court affirmed that the Pickering defense was unavailable in
the case as a matter of law.7" In Allaire v. Rogers,73 the Fifth Circuit
summarily concluded that since the speech involved concerned issues
of public importance, it merited constitutional protection "absent
proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made." 74 These
cases reflect the need to protect rigorously the public's right to receive
information necessary to check government abuse.7" This should
serve as a model for other courts facing the same problem.
Finally, it should be noted that the discussion concerning retalia-
tion applies not only to dismissals but also to other retaliatory ac-
tions, such as demotion, failure to reappoint, reduction in pay, and
transfers. Although there is some division among the lower courts,
most have found the same standards should be applied to any type of
retaliatory action that is likely to chill the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.76 The Pickering decision referred to this standard,77
72. Id.
73. 658 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1981).
74. Id. at 1065. The court relied upon the analysis in Pickering in which a similar
analogy was drawn to the New York Times malice standard used in libel actions
where the object of the libel is a public official or public figure. See, Pickering, 391
U.S. at 574. Overturning the trial court's ruling that speech was not a motivating
factor, this court proceeded to uphold the employee's lobbying efforts as "obviously"
entitled to first amendment protection because of their public importance.
75. See supra note 3.
76. The court in Stone v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980) noted the
conflict among courts as to whether public employees can maintain actions based on a
claim that their employer altered the conditions of employment. Id. at 529 n.7. The
court cited McGill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1979) (a retaliatory trans-
fer gives rise to a first amendment claim), and contrasts it with Morey v. Indiana
School Dist., 312 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (D. Minn. 1969), aft'd, 429 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.
1970) (denial of usual scheduled salary increase did not rise to a constitutional level).
Rejecting the latter, the Fifth Circuit then assumed that denial of increase in salary or
granting of an inadequate raise, if done in retaliation, is an actionable injury. See
also Bart v. Teford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (subjecting an employee to
harassment and ridicule for exercising the right of free speech is actionable if found to
deter a person from that exercise); Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1980) (denial of promotion constitutes a violation of the first amendment); Swil-
ley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1980) (placement of a letter of reprimand in
a teacher's personnel file implicated the first amendment); Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623
F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1980) (the court reversed the trial court's decision that the incident
did not rise to a constitutional level, finding that the placement of a verbal reprimand
in plaintifi's file might have a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech, creating a
prima facie case); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443
U.S. 911 (1979) (retaliatory transfer is actionable); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114
(1st Cir. 1977) (a transfer constitutes a first amendment violation, although the court
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as do other Supreme Court cases that stress the deterrent effect the
condition exerts on the exercise of constitutional rights rather than
the condition itself.7" Although some retaliatory actions, such as sim-
ply a verbal reprimand may not result in the award of significant
damages, 9 this should not affect the question of whether the plaintiff
has established a prima facie case of a first amendment violation.
The only inquiry should be whether the action taken would chill the
exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, a denial of a promotion, a
transfer, a letter of reprimand placed in an employee's personnel file,
or other changes in conditions of employment might all suffice to sat-
isfy the initial burden of establishing that the employer's action im-
plicates first amendment rights.
In short, despite some rather confusing signals from the Supreme
Court, government employees should be able successfully to litigate
first amendment retaliation suits unless the employer carries the bur-
den of proving that his action was not truly motivated by the speech
incident or that compelling justifications warrant the suppression of
the employee's rights.
II. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR RETALIATORY CONDUCT
As noted at the beginning of this article, many plaintiffs recently
have brought suits against municipalities or other local government
entities, alleging retaliation for the exercise of first amendment
rights.8" Until 1978 such litigation was precluded due to the Supreme
Court interpretation of the key civil rights provision, 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983, as permitting suits only against natural persons.81 A1-
proceeded to hold that damages in the form of past wages would be justified only if
the transfer constituted an effective discharge). See also Note, FirstAmendment Limi-
tations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 181 (1982) (arguing
that all adverse personnel actions taken because of an employee's political affiliation
are unconstitutional).
77. 391 U.S. at 574.
78. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute was found to be over-
broad because of its chilling effect on protected conduct); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (stressing that expression can be infringed "by the
denial of or the placing of conditions upon a benefit or a privilege").
79. See Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (Ist Cir. 1977).
80. See, e.g., Correa v. Nampa School Dist., 645 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1981); Smalley
v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1981); Columbus Educ. Ass'n. v. Colum-
bus City School Dist., 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980); Hoopes v. City of Chester, 473 F.
Supp. 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) reads:
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though government officials were named as defendants in these suits,
relief was limited by the existence of absolute and qualified immunity
defenses.82 The Supreme Court has held that judges, prosecutors and
legislators are totally immunized from damage suits,83 leaving their
employees almost remediless. 4 Other government officials are enti-
tled to a good faith defense, and a defendant can escape liability for
damages by establishing that he neither knew, nor should have
known, that he was violating constitutional rights.8" In light of the
difficulty courts have had in balancing the employee's right to engage
in first amendment activity against the government interests,8 6 it is
clear how this defense would bar most damage awards. Unless the
government official knew, or should have known, that the govern-
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) the Court held that Congress did not
intend to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of § 1983.
82. See, e.g., Hickman v. Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 619 F.2d 606,
610 (6th Cir. 1980) (school board members who refused to renew teacher's contract on
the basis of recommendations grounded on constitutionally impermissible reasons
were entitled to immunity from damage liability); Sullivan v. Meade Independent
School Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976) (since the school board acted in
good faith in discharging plaintiff for living "without benefit of marriage" with a male
friend, no damages could be awarded).
83. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951) (legislative immunity). Recently the Supreme Court added the President
of the United States to this list. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
84. The Supreme Court has confirmed that legislative immunity extends to § 1983
actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief as well as damages. Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). On the other hand, the Supreme
Court specifically left open the question as to whether judicial immunity extends to
suits for declaratory or injunctive relief, noting the division among the courts of ap-
peals on this issue. Id. at 735.
85. The Court has established this immunity for a number of types of officials.
See, e.g., Harlowe v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982) (federal executive officials);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials and officers); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (local school board members); O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1974) (superintendent of state hospital); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor and other state executive officers); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (law enforcement personnel).
86. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
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ment's interests were outweighed by the employee's right to engage in
first amendment activity, he could not be held liable for his actions.
In 1978, the Supreme Court opened a new door. In that year the
Court held, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,87 that political
subdivisions, including cities, counties, school boards, welfare depart-
ments, and other public entities, may be sued as "persons" under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. Two years later, in Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence,83 the Court held that a municipality does not share the good
faith defense of its officials. Thus, although under previous case law
an employee might be entitled only to an injunction against an em-
ployer reinstating him to his position, 9 Owen made possible the re-
covery of damages from the governmental entity for violation of first
amendment rights.9"
Both Monell and Owen made clear, however, that liability was not
absolute. In Monell, Justice Brennan expressly indicated that local
government cannot be held liable solely on the basis of respondeat
superior, that is, government liability cannot rest simply on the em-
ployer-employee relationship.9" An employee must point to a "pol-
icy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted
t ..[or] governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decision-making
channels."92 Thus, liability, if it is to be established, requires a causal
link between some official policy or custom and the conduct that de-
prived a person of his first amendment rights.93
Although in Owen the Supreme Court adhered to its view that re-
spondeat superior may not be a basis for establishing liability, the
Court, at the same time, stressed the importance of enforcing section
87. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
88, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
89. See cases cited supra in note 82.
90. Recent decisions awarding substantial damages against local governments to
compensate for first amendment violations are discussed supra note 180 and accom-
panying text.
91. 436 U.S. at 691.
92 Id. at 690.
93. The causation requirement stems from the language of § 1983 (supra note 81)
as well as Supreme Court case law reflecting the importance of this element. See infra
notes 118-25 and accompanying text for discussion of Rizzo v. Goode and its progeny.
See also Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. Rv. 213,
234-35 (1979) (construing the causation requirement of § 1983).
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1983 as a deterrent to future unconstitutional deprivations.9 4 The de-
cision also focused on the concern for equitable loss spreading, that
is, the notion that the cost of improper conduct should be spread to
the community as a whole on a loss spreading insurance theory.95
The Court stated, "no longer is individual blame-worthiness the acid
test of liability; the principle of equitable loss spreading has joined
fault as a factor in distributing the cost of official misconduct." 96 The
implication from the case is that when a local government is deemed
responsible, distributing the cost to the citizenry should not be viewed
as a raid on the public treasury, but rather as a means of compensat-
ing remediless victims and of preventing future misconduct. The de-
cision thus supports a liberal reading of the policy or custom
requirement.
A. Liabilityfor Official Policies
The Court in Monell made it clear that liability can be imposed
when a city's written statutes, ordinances or regulations subject or
cause the deprivation.97 Thus, if a given personnel decision can be
deemed to have been "officially adopted and promulgated by [the
city's] officers," Monell would appear to be satisfied.98 It is highly
unlikely, however, that a municipality will adopt a statute or ordi-
nance actually authorizing retaliation for the exercise of protected
speech.99 Furthermore, although a government employer may be
94. 445 U.S. at 655.
95. Id. at 657.
96. Id. In addition, most cities and counties plan for losses and buy insurance,
thus discounting exaggerated claims of impending bankruptcy. See Note, Local Gov.
eminent Entities No Longer Absolutely Immune Under Section 1983, 28 DEPAUL L.
Rnv. 429,447 (1979); Note, MoneU v. Department of Social Services: The Emergence
of Afunicipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 8 CAP. U. L. REv. 103, 124 (1979).
97. 436 U.S. at 690.
98. Id. See Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir. 1978) (discharges are
municipal acts when the discharging body is authorized by the municipality to make
such decisions); Himmelbrand v. Harrison, 484 F. Supp. 803, 810 (W.D. Va. 1980)
(citing Aonell for the view that municipal liability may be predicated upon the con-
duct of a single official, so long as his conduct actually represents the official position
of the city in a given matter).
99. There have been a few instances, however, where government regulations
aimed specifically at the speech of their employees have been struck on the grounds of
overbreadth, i.e., as impermissibly encompassing protected speech. See, e.g., Mescall
v. Rochford, 655 F.2d 111, 113 (7th Cir. 1981) (overbroad rule prohibiting police
officers from joining certain labor organizations violates their first amendment rights);
Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1199 (5th Cir. 1981) (regulations prohibiting "un-
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acting pursuant to a general statute permitting punishment or dis-
charge "for cause," such provisions have been facially upheld."°  On
the other hand, it is arguable that when a vague statute vests broad
discretion in a government employer who engages in unconstitutional
action, this should be deemed sufficient to impose liability on the mu-
nicipality. The Fifth Circuit specifically recognized this in a case in-
volving the county treasurer's dismissal of his assistant for exercising
his free speech: "A county must be held accountable for more than
its officially-codified policies; in cases where the written law of a local
government entity vests unbridled authority. . in an individual, his
decisions become the controlling law and official policy of the en-
tity."'' Thus, even though the government body had not adopted an
explicit policy that sanctioned retaliatory conduct, it had through its
vague laws "caused" the violation of the employee's rights. Other
courts have reached the same conclusion by holding that the actions
of policy-making officials are deemed governmental acts.' 0 2 This
analysis will be explored in the next section.
B. Single Acts by High-Level Officials as Relecting
Municipal Policy
In the absence of a written regulation, plaintiffs must look to either
unwritten or de facto policy or custom in order to establish municipal
authorized public statements and denying department employees their right to speak
to reporters on any "controversial" topic struck as inhibiting protected expression).
100. The Supreme Court in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) upheld a civil
service dismissal for "such course as will promote the efficiency of the service." Id. at
161-62. It reasoned that the quoted standard was "essentially fair" and that requiring
greater specificity was not feasible "[b]ecause of the infinite variety of factual situa-
tions in which public statements by government employees might reasonably justify
dismissal for 'cause."' Id. at 161. The Supreme Court sustained a similarly vague
statute in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also Davis v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1100, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980), upholding on authority of Arnett and Parker the facial
validity of a rule prohibiting "conduct prejudicial to good order" as used against a
public employee who was fired for speaking with a reporter, Key v. Rutherford, 645
F.2d 880, 882-83 (10th Cir. 1981), upholding the facial validity of a city regulation
prohibiting employees from "discussing complaints or problems with city council
members."
101. Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Schnap-
per, Civil Rights Litigation after Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979), similarly
arguing that "[i]f an employee exercising such delegated authority decides upon a
goal or on a method of achieving it which violates the Constitution, that decision is
the government policy." Id. at 219.
102. See infra notes 108-12.
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liability. °3 Several difficult questions interpreting "custom" have
arisen in the courts of appeals. For example, should a single act of a
supervisory official such as the mayor or chief of police be deemed
binding on the municipality? Since most personnel decisions are
made by high-level officials, this issue has been especially critical in
retaliation suits. The appellate courts are generally in agreement that
single actions taken by a lower level official are not sufficient to bind
the municipality."° On the other hand, when the police chief,
mayor, city council, school board, county commissioners or other de-
partment head performs the unconstitutional action, such conduct re-
flects official municipal policy.' Since a municipal corporation is a
fictitious entity that acts only through its officials, "[a] government
should not be able to free itself from liability by merely subdelegating
duties and responsibilities to such officials."' 0 6 Justice Brennan rec-
ognized this when he stated that a section 1983 violation may be
103. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
104. See, e.g., Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 651 (7th Cir. 1981) (a single
incident of arrest or unlawful search and seizure is insufficient); Avery v. County of
Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1980) (single incidents are not normally sufficient
to impose liability); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 747 (1st Cir. 1980)
(single failure to investigate perjury charge is not a "custom"); Marrero v. City of
Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. deniedsub nom. Rashkind v. Marrero, 450
U.S. 913 (1981) (city could not be sued for single incident of unlawful search and
seizure); Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a single instance of
individual misconduct, however reprehensible if true, does not indicate systematic,
city-supported abuses of the nature to which Monell makes reference). Contra Owens
v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (a single brutal incident may be a suffi-
cient causal link between the county's failure to train and violation of constitutional
rights); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ( a colossal intimi-
dation might suffice to impose liability). See also Note, Allocating Liabilltyfor Consti-
tutional Torts: Reconciling the Officials Liability for Unconstitutional Conduct, the
Entitie's Liabilityfor Unconstitutional Official Policy, and the Immunity Doctrine, 46
ALB. L. REv. 475, 492 n.81 (1982).
105. This concept stems from the language in Monell that liability may be im-
posed where a constitutional wrong results from acts (or omissions) by the entity's
"lawmakers or by those edicts or acts [that] may fairly be said to represent official
policy." 436 U.S. at 694. For a more limited reading of this language, see Note, supra
note 104, arguing that a senior official's actions should not impose liability absent a
closer connection between the conduct and the entity either through ratification or
approval of the senior official's conduct by others or the involvement of subordinates
in enforcing the official's scheme. This more stringent interpretation has been
adopted by only a few lower courts. See infra note 112.
106. Comment, New Damage Remediesfor Violations of Constitutional Rights, 31
BAYLOR L. REv. 67, 74-75 (1979). See also Peters, Municoal Liability after Owen v.
City of Independence and Maine v. Thiboutot, 13 URB. LAW. 407, 411-12 (1981);
Schnapper, supra note 101, at 215-19; Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services:
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chargeable to a municipality when the constitutional tort can be
traced to "those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy ... ""'
Adopting this analysis, several circuits have held local govern-
ments liable for the unconstitutional conduct of those who occupy
policymaking positions. Thus, when the police chief is the final re-
pository of city power in charge of the police department, his employ-
ment decisions have been held to bind the municipality.10 8 Similarly,
a city may be held liable for the actions of its mayor because his
actions may fairly be said to represent official policy.'0 9 The same
conclusion has been reached with regard to school board trustees," 0
the head of the department of corrections at a state institution,"' and
other high ranking officials." 2 Generally, the court examines the
The Emergence of Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 8 CAP. U.L. REV. 103,
115 (1979).
107. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
108. Black v. Stephans, 662 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1981) (the acts of the police
chief represent the official policy of the city because the chief is the final authority in
charge of the police force).
109. Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir.
1980) ("the mayor is the one city official whose edicts and acts represent municipal
policy"),
110. Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980)
("School district personnel decisions by the body entrusted with such decisions are
'officially adopted and promulgated.' "). The court explained that the actions of the
board of trustees bind the district "because the only way the district can act, practi-
cally as well as legally, is by and through its Board of Trustees." Id. at 1112. Accord
Moore v. Tangipahoe Parish School Bd., 594 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1979).
111. See Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1980) (in those
areas in which the director is "the final authority or ultimate repository of city
power," his conduct and decisions are binding).
112. See, e.g., Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3838 (1982) (the sheriffs acts in demoting an officer may fairly be said to
represent county policy); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir.
1980) ("at least in those areas in which [the judge] is the final authority. . .. his
official conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered those.. . for which the
county may be held responsible"); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A. & M. Univ., 612
F2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1980) (action of university officials denying official registration
to a homosexual student organization subjects the university to liability under
§ 1983); Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1979) (college
president who recommended firing of instructor is one whose acts represent official
policy); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir. 1978) (discharge from employ-
ment is an "official act" where the discharging body-school board members-is au-
thorized by the city to make such decisions). Contra Johnson v. Granholm, 662 F.2d
449, 450 (6th Cir. 1981) (even if county board of commissioners was the employer of
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statute granting power to determine whether in fact the individual
has been given final authority over particular employment deci-
sions.1 3 Thus, even a single action of firing or punishing a govern-
ment employee for engaging in protected activity should suffice to
satisfy the policy requirement imposed by the Monell decision." 14
Any municipal employee who holds a significant policymaking posi-
tion affecting the rights of others should be deemed to represent the
government entity and thus create liability on the part of that entity.
As one court noted, "[A] discharge from municipal employment is
quite clearly an official action where the discharging body is author-
ized by the municipality to make such decisions."'
C. Actions of Lower Level Officials. The Respondeat
Superior Barrier
When the employment decision is not rendered by a high ranking
government official, the question of municipal liability becomes more
difficult. As noted, it is well established that a single action taken by
a lower level official is normally insufficient to bind the municipal-
ity.116 Thus, where an employee's immediate supervisor allegedly re-
taliates against him for having engaged in protected first amendment
activity, the employee may be relegated to suing the person individu-
ally. A plaintiff may be able to impose liability, however, on a mu-
individual defendants, the board was not liable unless it can be shown that the acts
complained of were taken pursuant to "policy or custom" of the municipal body),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3975 (1982); Di Maggio v. O'Brien, 497 F. Supp. 870, 874
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (city council member and building inspector did not have authority to
make policy); Hoopes v. City of Chester, 473 F. Supp. 1214, 1225-26 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
modffled sub nom. Hoopes v. Nacrelli, 512 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (mayor's
defamatory campaign directed against the city's police chief, culminating in his de-
motion, was action taken for the mayor's own personal gain and was not binding on
the city); Vasquez v. City of Reno, 461 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Nev. 1978) (city policy
chief and psychologist did not create policy when they developed and administered a
test which discriminated in hiring).
113. See, e.g., Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982) (the question is one
of identifying the official who has authority to make policy; then municipal liability
attaches to acts performed pursuant to that policy). The court noted that: "[W]hen
an official has final authority in a matter involving the selection of goals or of means
of achieving goals, his choices represent governmental policy." Id. at 989. See also
Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1980); Schnapper, supra note
101, at 213-21.
114. See cases cited supra note 112.
115. Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir. 1978).
116. See supra note 104.
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nicipality by establishing a custom or usage. 17 The meaning of these
words is far from clear. 1 Earlier Supreme Court rulings appeared
to give a narrow reading to these terms. In Rizzo v. Goode,I 9 the
Supreme Court refused to issue even an injunction against the police
commissioner, city managing director and mayor based on incidents
of police misconduct on the part of some officers. The Court rea-
soned that "there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of
the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any
plan or policy by petitioners--express or otherwise-showing their
authorization or approval of such misconduct."120 The Court distin-
guished earlier decisions in which injunctive relief had been granted
based on a "pervasive pattern flowing from a deliberate plan" to sup-
press constitutional rights.' 2 '
Subsequent decisions have sought to narrow the Rizzo requirement
of "affirmative action." In Estelle v. Gamble,'22 the Supreme Court
held that "deliberate indifference" to civil rights states a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983." Several lower federal courts have ex-
panded on this rationale, holding that failure to act in face of actual
or imputed knowledge of violation of federal rights creates a viable
cause of action under section 1983.124 Justice Marshall, citing these
117. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
118. Justice Brennan in the Monell decision referred to Justice Harlan's definition
of "custom" in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 436 U.S. at 691.
Justice Harlan defined custom as a "persistent and widespread" practice. 398 U.S. at
167-68. See also Ballen, Municqxl Liability under § 1983: the Meaning of "Policy of
Custom," 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 315-17 (1979); Kushnir, Government Tort Liability,
12 URR. LAW. 466, 471-73 (1980); Seplowitz, Municipal Liability, 47 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 517, 548-51 (1981); Comment, Municipal Liability under § 1983for Civil Viola-
tions after Monell, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1032, 1041-45 (1979).
119. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
120. Id. at 371.
121. Id. at 373-75, discussing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (police miscon-
duct was rooted in the adoption and enforcement of deliberate policies by the defend-
ants) and Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (persistent pattern flowed from an
intentional, conspiratorial effort of defendants to deprive labor organizers of their first
amendment rights).
122. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
123. Id. at 106.
124. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832 (2d Cir. 1977) ("where
conduct of the supervisory authority is directly related to the denial of a constitutional
right, it is not to be distinguished as a matter of causation, upon whether it was action
or inaction"); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1069 (7th Cir. 1976)
(Rizzo does not apply where the record established a pattern or practice of violations);
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decisions with approval, has stated that the basis for denying relief in
Rizzo was the lack of evidence that defendant officials had knowl-
edge of their subordinates' unconstitutional actions.125 In addition,
the injunctive relief sought was quite intrusive, counselling restraint
on the part of the Court.'2 6
Even more significant is the fact that Rizzo dealt with holding indi-
vidual supervisory officials liable for the conduct of their subordi-
nates. 127 The Court's unwillingness to impose liability on such
individuals is reflected in its development of qualified and absolute
immunity.12 8  The immunity defense is predicated upon the policy
concerns that personal liability would have an undue chilling effect
on the exercise of official responsibility; that it would be unjust to
subject officials to liability when they are legally required to exercise
discretion; that it would create a danger that the official would be
deterred in his willingness to execute his office with decisiveness that
is required for the public good; and that it might deter citizens from
holding public office. 129 These concerns are not applicable to munic-
ipal liability, leading to the Court's rejection of any qualified immu-
Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (supervisory defendant is liable where he
has notice of past culpable conduct of subordinates and fails to prevent recurrence in
violation of a state statutory duty).
125. Lewis v. Hyland, 434 U.S. 931, 933 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting to the
denial of certiorari).
126. Id. at 933-34. See also Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th
Cir. 1976) (distinguishing Rizzo on the ground that plaintiffs sought an affirmative
decree requiring less court supervision).
127. Rizzo was decided before Monell permitted suits against municipalities;
therefore, the only question was that of supervisory liability. Later decisions have
recognized that different considerations are presented when municipal liability is at
issue. See Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982); Walters v. Ocean
Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1980); Turpin v. Mallet, 619 F.2d 196, 199
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980). See also Note, Damage Remedies
.4gainst Municipalities, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 922, 956-57 (1976); Comment, Section 1983
Municoal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 935,
948 (1979).
128. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. In the recent decision of
Harlowe v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982), the Court further expanded the protec-
tion of government officials by eliminating the subjective element of official immunity
which had previously precluded summary judgement for government officials when-
ever allegations of malicious intent were made. The Court held that government
officials are insulated from having to defend against civil damage suits provided their
conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 2738.
129. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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nity for local government. 3 ° In addition, the very fact that officials
enjoy such immunity, leaving the victim remediless, counsels in favor
of a relaxation of the policy or custom requirement with respect to
municipal liability. 131 Thus, the Rizzo mandate that there be an af-
firmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of po-
lice misconduct and the supervisory officials should not be binding
on plaintiffs seeking to hold the government unit rather than individ-
uals liable.
D. Establishing Liability Through a Pattern or Practice of Abuse
Several lower court decisions have given a liberal construction to
the custom or policy requirement. In some cases, the plaintiff has
been able to establish liability by arguing a pattern of conduct or a
series of acts violative of constitutional rights.132 Such allegations
raise an inference of municipal policy. For example, in Owen, the
Supreme Court did not challenge the Eighth Circuit ruling that the
series of actions taken by government officials during the course of
Owen's discharge amounted to official policy. 133 Similarly, in Glaros
130. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-57 (1980).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
132. This concept is derived from the Supreme Court's language in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). "Congress included customs and usages [in
§ 1983] because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state offi-
cials ... although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials
could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with
the force of law." Id. at 167-68. The case has been cited and relied upon to establish
an actionable custom in several cases. See, e.g., Knight v. Carlson, 478 F. Supp. 55,
58-59 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Mayes v. Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188, 1192-94 (N.D. IIl. 1979).
133. The facts indicated that Owen was discharged and stigmatized in violation of
his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals determined that the city stigmatized
Owen when it acted upon the city councilman's slanderous charges and directed that
the investigation report alleging police department mismanagement be referred to the
county prosecutor for presentation to the Grand Jury. 589 F.2d at 337. Following
Owen's dismissal, the city manager publicly announced the referral of the controver-
sial report. Based on these facts, the Eighth Circuit was persuaded that the series of
actions amounted to official policy, a conclusion not challenged by the majority of the
Supreme Court. This suggests a flexible approach whereby a series of occurrences,
joined together, may rise to the level of official policy sufficient to subject the city to
liability under § 1983. Justice Powell, dissenting from the decision, argued that re-
spondeat superior absolved the city of liability. While conceding that accusations
made before a city council meeting by a councilman accusing Owen of gross ineffi-
ciencies and other inappropriate actions were "neither measured nor benign," Powell
contended that "the statements of a single councilman scarcely rise to the level of
municipal policy." 444 U.S. at 660, 663-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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v. Perse,"' the First Circuit held that the plaintifi's allegation that he
was continuously under surveillance by members of the Cambridge
Police Department supported a claim that the police department en-
gaged in a policy of unconstitutional investigation into political
groups." 5 Further, the Second Circuit, in Heimbach v. Village of Ly-
ons, 36 found allegations that village authorities unconstitutionally
prevented plaintiffs from opposing a redevelopment plan by wrong-
fully evicting and illegally arresting various members were sufficient
to support their suit against the municipality. 37 The Seventh Circuit
reached the same conclusion in Powe v. City of Chicago,13 holding
that Powe's allegations that he was a victim of a series of unlawful
arrests, each based upon the same invalid warrant, were sufficient to
raise the inference that municipal defendants were responsible for the
alleged arrests.
13 9
Thus, a plaintiff may be able to impose municipal liability by argu-
ing that the action taken against him is simply one in a series of retal-
iatory actions taken against him and/or other government
employees, thus establishing a type of pattern or practice that should
have been rectified by the municipality. The existence of a pattern of
abuse tends to indicate a complete failure to supervise,1 40 gross negli-
gence, 141 or deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality, 142
134. 628 F.2d 679 (Ist Cir. 1980).
135. Id. at 686.
136. 597 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1979).
137. Id. at 346.
138. 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 651.
140. See, eg., Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)
(complete failure to train or training so reckless that future misconduct is almost inev-
itable); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (official policy
may be established by omissions, as well as by affirmative acts). Accord Cameron v.
Montgomery County Child Welfare, 471 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Mayes v.
Elrod, 470 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. M11. 1979).
141. Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (liability may be imposed
where a municipality is grossly negligent in supervising its agents, and the negligence
results in a constitutional deprivation); Popow v. Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1243
(D. N.J. 1979) (gross negligence should be the subject of § 1983 actions even where
simple negligence is not); Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (inadequate supervision alone may be actionable where the supervisor's failure
to rectify the problem approaches recklessness); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F.
Supp. 585, 590 (D. R.I. 1978) (municipality may be liable if it trains its officers in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner). The majority of lower courts have held, how-
ever, that simple negligence is not actionable. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565
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all of which should be deemed sufficient to hold the government
accountable. 1
43
E. Establishing Liability Through Authorization or Acquiescence in
the Unconstitutional Conduct
A second and related possibility arises when a plaintiff can estab-
lish that high level officials actually knew of possible constitutional
violations and yet took no action. When the plaintiff has complained
to a higher authority but did not find his claim satisfied, this should
provide another avenue for the imposition of municipal liability.
This situation arose in the case of Herrera v. Valentine,1" where sev-
eral complaints of police brutality against Indians had been lodged
with the appropriate officials. The complaints were taken under ad-
visement, but officials initiated no action.145 In addition, the plain-
tiffs had appeared before the city council and made known their
various complaints."4 These facts satisfied the court that the city was
adequately notified that its police force needed close and continuing
supervision. The court held the city's failure to remedy the problems
(7th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp. 767, 772 n.6 (D. Utah 1981) (listing several
cases which have reached this conclusion). The minority position is reflected in the
cases cited at 510 F. Supp. at 773 n.7. The Supreme Court recently held, contrary to
this precedent, that since § 1983 imposes no state of mind requirement even claims of
simple negligence are actionable. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The ques-
tion of actionability is, of course, analytically distinct from that of municipal damage
liability in light of the respondeat superior barrier. Parratt does mean, however, that
even negligent actions of high level officials should be binding upon the municipality.
See discussion supra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (liabil-
ity attaches where failure to promulgate policies and regulations rose to the level of
deliberate indifference to individual rights); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644,
650 (5th Cir. 1979) (callous and conscious indifference to plaintiff's medical needs
gives rise to an eighth amendment claim under § 1983). Accord Turpin v. Mallet, 619
F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1980); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979);
White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). Contra Edmonds v. Dillins, 485 F.
Supp. 722 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (specifically rejects the deliberate indifference standard
in favor of a "recklessness requirement").
143. See Levinson, Suing Political Subdivisions in Federal Court: From Adelman
to Owen, 11 TOLEDO L. REv. 829, 844-45 (1980); Peters, Municipal Liability, supra
note 106, at 422-25; Note, Monell and Owen in the Police Injury Context: Municipal
Liability Under § 1983 Without Supervirorial Fault, 16 U.S.F.L. Rnv. 517, 522-28
(1982).
144, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
145. Id. at 1225.
146. Id.
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associated with its overzealous police force sufficient to impose
liability.
147
Similarly in the case of retaliation suits, it is arguable that failure
to reverse an improper employment action is implicit ratification of
the action by those with ultimate decisionmaking authority.14 Sev-
eral lower federal courts have held that if a city impliedly or tacitly
authorizes, approves or encourages the alleged unconstitutional con-
duct, it should be deemed to have promulgated an official policy
within the meaning of Monell.149  This analysis suggests the impor-
147. Id. at 1224. "A municipality's continuing failure to remedy known unconsti-
tutional conduct of its police officers is the type of informal policy or custom that is
amenable to suit under § 1983" (citing Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S.
at 690-91 & n.56). 653 F.2d at 1224.
148. Peters, Municpal Liability, supra note 106, at 439-43 (a municipality should
expect to be responsible under § 1983 for terminations done in derogation of constitu-
tional rights). Accord Kramer, Section 1983 and Municioal Liability: Selected Issues
Two Years After Monel v. Department of Social Services, 12 URB. LAW. 232, 244
(1980).
149. See, e.g., Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 425 (M.D.
Pa. 1978) (allegations that plaintiff was fired for speaking out on matters of public
concern and that the authorities ratified the firing is clearly sufficient to establish lia-
bility). See also Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 649 (7th Cir. 1980) (a munici-
pality "acts" by countenancing the practices of its employees); Avery v. County of
Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1980) (liability will be imposed on the county
where the board's action constituted tacit authorization of plaintiffs sterilization);
Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1980) (arrests and strip
searches if occurring frequently with knowledge of the defendants might show dere-
liction of duty of a constitutional dimension); Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v.
Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979) (policy
was made when members of the board of appeals encouraged assessors to discrimi-
nate against the plaintiff); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 1978) (actions
of employees will be binding upon the municipality if they are authorized, sanctioned
or ratified at a policy-making level); Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp. 767, 771 (D. Utah
1981) (the cause of action is available under § 1983 "when the defendant was in a
position of responsibility, knew or should have known of the misconduct, and yet
failed to act to prevent future harm"); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237,
1246-47 (D. NJ. 1979) (persistent failure to discipline or control subordinates in face
of knowledge of their propensity for improper use of force may constitute an actiona-
ble official policy or defacto policy).
Some courts have imposed a stricter standard for the imposition of municipal lia-
bility, relying to a large degree upon the language in Rizzo. See, e.g., Spriggs v. City
of Chicago, 523 F. Supp. 138, 143 (N.D. IM. 1981) (municipal liability will be imposed
only where an action creates a substantial probability that undesirable subordinate
behavior will manifest itself in increased and significant amounts). See also Ballen,
Munici7al Liability under § 1983: the Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 304 (1979). Ballen argues that Congress intended in enacting § 1983 to impose
an affirmative duty on state and local governments to protect their residents against a
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tance of exhausting any available administrative remedies, as was
done in Herrera, in order to support a claim for municipal
liability.' 50
Thus, plaintiffs may be able to establish government liability for
retaliatory conduct based on either the presence of a persistent and
widespread practice, reflecting the failure of the government to super-
vise or control, or the presence or imputation of knowledge and in-
action on the part of those in authority. This, coupled with the
doctrine that the municipality is liable for the actions of those in poli-
cymaking positions, should enable most government employees to
avoid the respondeat superior barrier.
III. THE RELIEF ISSUE: DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Having explored the liability issues in first amendment retaliation
cases, it is next important to examine the relief question. Before the
Supreme Court's rulings in Monell and Owen, injunctive relief in
suits naming individual officials as defendants was the primary vehi-
cle for vindicating first amendment rights.' Since damages were
generally unavailable both because of immunity defenses' 52 as well
as the financial limitations of individual government officials, em-
ployees sought reinstatement to positions they had lost or promotions
that had been denied because of their exercise of first amendment
rights. The importance of the recent decisions opening the door to
municipal liability is that now damages are available to vindicate the
employee's rights.153 Assuming plaintiff can overcome the liability
wide range of official action or inaction which denied them enjoyment of their consti-
tutional rights. Ballen's careful analysis of the legislative history of § 1983 supports
this conclusion.
150. The Supreme Court recently clarified that exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct.
2557 (1982). Nonetheless, this discussion suggests tactical reasons for pursuing ad-
ministrative remedies-namely to establish municipal liability through the ratifica-
tion of a subordinate's decision.
151. In addition to reinstatement, a few courts granted back pay in retaliation
suits, avoiding the good faith defense by characterizing the award as equitable relief.
See Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979); Rosada v. Santiago,
562 F.2d 114 (Ist Cir. 1977).
152. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
153. The Supreme Court's decision in Monell permitted suits naming municipali-
ties as defendants, while the Owen decision denied cities the immunities which were
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hurdles discussed in the first two sections,154 he is entitled to full re-
lief, including an award of damages, against the government.
Generally three types of damage relief should be considered in
bringing retaliation cases: 1) presumed damages for violation of
plaintiff's substantive first amendment rights;'55 2) compensatory
damages to recover for actual injury sustained, including both out-of-
pocket expenses, such as lost earnings, as well as compensation for
mental distress and humiliation, which are often suffered in retalia-
tion situations,' 56 and 3) nominal damages.1 57 The Supreme Court
in the recent case of City ofNewport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 158 held that
one form of relief, punitive damages, is not available against munici-
palities. Therefore, plaintiffs are limited to the recovery of punitive
damages against officials in their individual capacity in suits wherein
they can establish that the officials acted with malice or reckless
disregard.1
59
held to insulate individual officials from damage liability. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 87-88.
154. These include both the substantive barriers imposed by the Pickering and Mt.
Healthy defenses to retaliation suits (see supra text accompanying notes 17-32) as well
as the hurdle of respondeat superior (see supra text accompanying notes 91-93).
155. See infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
158. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
159. For a discussion of the propriety of punitive damages in constitutional tort
cases, see Love, Damages: A Remedyfor the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 1242, 1274-81 (1979). There is a great degree of confusion among the
courts of appeals as to the proper standard to be utilized in determining whether an
award of punitive damages is permissible. See, e.g., Brown v. Bullard Indep. School
Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981) (no evidence of the type of "malevolent, outra-
geous or abusive conduct" to justify punitive damages); Cochetti v. Desmond, 572
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1978) (punitive damages may be awarded to punish persons who
have engaged in particularly egregious conduct and to deter such conduct in the fu-
ture); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911
(1979) (punitive damages require a showing of "gross disregard for plaintifi's rights");
Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (something more than intentional
interference with constitutional rights must be found in order to justify punitive dam-
ages in a retaliatory transfer case, Ze., plaintiff must establish "aggravating circum-
stances"); Guzman v. Western Bank, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1976) (reckless
indifference must be shown). The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in the
case of Smith v. Wade, 51 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Oct. 26, 1982), as to whether a showing of
actual malice on the part of the defendant is required to support an award of punitive
damages.
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A. Presumed Damages for Violation of First Amendment Rights
As to the question of presumed damages for deprivation of consti-
tutional rights, the Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus'6o held that a
plaintiff could recover only nominal damages for a procedural due
process violation in the absence of proof of actual injury. 161 Argu-
ments have been made in the lower courts that Carey should control
all cases where damages are sought for the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights per se.162 In Carey, however, the Court specifically noted
that cases awarding damages for deprivation of substantive constitu-
tional rights were not affected by its decision. 63 It directed lower fed-
eral courts to inquire whether the specific constitutional guarantee at
stake had a common law analogue."6 The Court reasoned that "in
some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the com-
mon law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a par-
ticular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to
apply the tort rule of damages directly to the § 1983 action."'165
In the context of retaliation suits, an analogy should be drawn to
the interests protected by the common law dignitary torts, which are
actions that involve some confrontation with the plaintiff in person or
some indirect affront to his personality, including assault, battery, in-
160. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
161. Id. at 247-48. For a critical discussion of the Court's conclusions in the Ca-
rey case, see Love, supra note 159, at 1247-70. See also Note, Damage Awards for
Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966
(1980).
162. See Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 746 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs in § 1983
actions must demonstrate some compensable injury in order to recover, even though
the case alleged first amendment violations); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682
F.2d 1203, 1220 (5th Cir. 1982) (first amendment violations unaccompanied by "any
real injury," justify an award of only nominal damages); Williams v. Board of Re-
gents of Univ. Sys., 629 F.2d 993, 1005 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating as a general principle
that damages must be proved, rather than presumed in § 1983 actions, citing Carey as
authority), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391,
402 (5th Cir. 1980) (awarding only nominal damages for deprivation of first amend-
ment association rights--arguing this was mandated by Carey); Pierce v. Stinson, 493
F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (damages for unlawful arrest and incarceration will
not be presumed; absent proof of actual injury, recovery is limited to nominal
damages).
163. 435 U.S. at 265.
164. Id. at 257-58. Section 1988 explicitly authorizes the use of common law rem-
edies in § 1983 actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
165. 435 U.S. at 258.
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tentional infliction of mental anguish, libel and slander.' 66 Even
though the injury that results is not an economic loss, the common
law has always redressed these torts with substantial damages. The
compensation is usually characterized as general damages-the type
that generally flow from the wrongful act, and that do not require
specific proof of emotional harm to the plaintiff.'67 The value that is
placed upon the dignitary loss is a question for the jury, subject, of
course, to review by the courts. 168 The Supreme Court in Carey im-
plicitly recognized the doctrine of presumed damages as it applies to
the dignitary torts of libel and defamation. 169 It reasoned that in
such cases injury is almost certain to result from the wrongful act,
and that the specific injury is difficult to prove. Moreover, since the
resulting injury is so likely, no purpose is served by requiring proof of
this kind.1
70
While still in the minority, a few courts of appeals are beginning to
recognize that substantial damages may be awarded for the violation
of substantive constitutional rights, including the first amendment.' 7 1
The difficulty, of course, is in assessing the value of the right violated.
In an earlier suit involving unlawful interference with the first
166. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.1, at 509 (1973).
167. Id. § 3.2, at 138-39. See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 8 (1935); H. McGREGOR, DAMAGES 15-20 (13th ed. 1972).
168. See Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919); Comment, Presumed
Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 204-07 (1980).
Courts have expressed reluctance, however, "to invade the particular province of the
jury in evaluating the value of civil rights." Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir.
1978). See also Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. 435 U.S. at 262.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 1981) (damages are
available for violation of plaintiff's substantive rights, ie., his liberty interests and
bodily integrity); Williams v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th
Cir. 1981) ("[D]amages for emotional harm are to be presumed where there is an
infringement of a substantive constitutional right."); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d
1220, 1228 (8th Cir. 1981) (substantial compensatory damages are recoverable for vio-
lation of liberty and privacy interests protected by the fifth and fourth amendments);
Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1979) (damages available for a depriva-
tion of due process rights springing from unlawful arrest and related matters); Hodge
v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1977) (damages may be presumed from the
denial of a constitutional right); Batista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 88 (3d Cir. 1965) (dam-
ages for due process violations); Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Va.
1978), aj'd., 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1979) (damages may be awarded since "official
racial segregation is inherently injurious"); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762,
772 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (damages for deprivation of liberty in wrongful arrest).
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amendment right to demonstrate, the District of Columbia Circuit
urged that compensation "not be approached in a niggardly
spirit, '  and that the amount be sufficient to "assure that rights are
not lightly to be disregarded .. ."'I'
More recently the Eighth Circuit, in an appeal challenging jury in-
structions, properly stressed the need to compensate fully civil rights
violations: "No monetary value we place upon constitutional rights
can measure their importance in our society or compensate a citizen
adequately for their deprivation."' 74 The court went on to instruct
the jury that it should consider the importance of the right in our
system of government, the role that this right has played in the his-
tory of our republic, and the significance of the right in the context of
the activities which the plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the
violation of the right.17
Using these guidelines, it is important to note that the first amend-
ment has enjoyed a special place in the hierarchy of constitutional
values, reflecting the view that free speech is critical in protecting all
other rights guaranteed under our constitutional system.'76 In fact,
presumed damages were long ago recognized in voting rights cases
when the same critical first amendment rights are at stake.'7 7 The
172. Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
173. Id. at 1287. Accord Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 195 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 428 U.S. 916 (1977) (loss of opportunity to express oneself constitutes a depri-
vation of an intangible first amendment interest entitling plaintiff to recover "not in-
significant" damages).
174. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1227 (8th Cir. 1981).
175. Id. Language very similar to that utilized by the Eighth Circuit was specifi-
cally approved by the Tenth Circuit in Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir.
1981). The jury was similarly instructed as to the great value of constitutional rights,
and then the same factors were enumerated. Note also Congress' recognition of the
value of liberty and privacy interests in Title VIII, in which it identified $100 a day as
the proper award for victims of unlawful wiretapping. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
176. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 576 (1980); Blasi,
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
521,552.
177. See Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919). "In the eyes of the law this
right is so valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it
without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing. .. ."
Id. at 66. Plaintiff was awarded $2,000 in general damages for being barred from the
polling booth. The Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, observed that it had allowed
damage actions to be maintained for wrongful deprivation of voting rights. 435 U.S.
at 265 n.22. It cited with approval the old English case of Ashby v. White, 1 Eng.
Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703), in which substantial compensatory damages were awarded
without proof of actual loss. Further, in the case of Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58
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difficulty in attaching a dollar value to voting rights lead to the adop-
tion of a presumed damage rule.178 Thus, before even addressing the
question of compensation for injury sustained, a jury should be in-
structed on the issue of damages for violation of first amendment
rights per se. The importance of such instructions will become
clearer upon examining the inadequacies of the other forms of relief.
B. Compensatory Damages in Retaliation Suits: Tangible and
Intangible Losses
The most obvious form of relief available in retaliation suits is the
recovery of lost wages resulting from unconstitutional dismissals, de-
motions, transfers, or denial of promotions. 79 It is important, how-
ever, to seek not only actual out-of-pocket expenses, but also
compensatory damages for mental anguish, humiliation and embar-
rassment that is often suffered by employees in this context. Parallels
should again be drawn to tort concepts reflected in libel suits where
substantial damage recovery has always been permissible. 80 The
Ninth Circuit in a first amendment retaliation suit expressly noted
that compensatory damages "are not limited to the out-of-pocket pe-
cuniary loss the complainant suffered. Damages can also be awarded
for emotional and mental distress caused by the intentional tort."''
Although the issue is just beginning to be litigated in the appellate
courts, a few have awarded substantial relief for intangible losses sus-
(1900), the Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging $2,500 in damages for the
deprivation of voting rights without asserting any actual losses satisfied the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement of $2,000.
178. See Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919).
179. Such damages fall within the rubric of special damages, le., those awarded
for past pecuniary losses arising out of circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff's case
and recoverable only upon proof of actual loss. See D. DOBBS, supra note 166, at
§ 3.2; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 167, at § 8; H. McGREGOR, supra note 167, at 15-
20. Several courts of appeals have upheld proved back pay awards in retaliation suits,
See, eg., Brown v. Bullard Indep. School Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981) (uphold-
ing an award for lost wages, although such was mitigated by the plaintiff's post-teach-
ing earnings); Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a teacher in a first amendment retaliation suit was entitled to back pay
continuing until effective reinstatement); Simineo v. School Dist. No. 16, 594 F.2d
1353 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding an award for loss of income in a first amendment
retaliation suit); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (awarding $7,000 in
back wages in a retaliatory transfer case).
180. See D. DOBBS, supra note 166, at § 7.2.
181. Donavan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970).
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tained in retaliation suits.182 For example, in the case of Busche v.
Burkee,183 the Seventh Circuit upheld a $10,000 award of compensa-
tory damages based entirely on injury to reputation and emotional
distress. The court stated that although no out-of-pocket expenses
were established, the damage award was justified to compensate the
plaintiff for emotional distress and damage to reputation. 84 Simi-
larly, the Fifth Circuit, in Williams v. Board of Regents,"s5 upheld a
substantial award of compensatory damages in a case involving a
wrongful discharge of the plaintiff for having disclosed that a police
accident report had been altered to protect the city police chief. The
court of appeals, while rejecting the theory of presumed damages,
upheld the award as supported by ample evidence of mental anguish
endured by the plaintiff' 86
As to the evidentiary issue noted in the last case, the Supreme
Court in Carey declined to discuss the matter of the amount of proof
required to sustain an award of damages for intangible losses such as
mental anguish and injury to reputation." 7 Lower federal courts
have expressed widely divergent views on this issue. Many have
182. See, e.g., Brule v. Southworth, 611 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1979) (upholding an
award of $1,000 for mental distress suffered as a result of defendant's retaliatory con-
duct); Simineo v. School Dist. No. 16, 594 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding an
award of $60,000 in compensatory damages, which included relief for injury to repu-
tation and to mental health); Stoddard v. School Dist. No. 1, 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir.
1979) (upholding an award of $33,000 in compensatory damages for wrongful dis-
charge). In addition to the aforementioned retaliation suits, courts have awarded sub-
stantial compensatory damages in the following suits, involving emotional distress
sustained during an unlawful arrest. See Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 898 (10th
Cir. 1981) (upholding damages for psychological harm suffered as a result of an un-
lawful arrest); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding $10,000
and $2,500 awards to two plaintiffs for the mental distress, humiliation and general
pain and suffering they had endured); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir.
1979) (recognizing the appropriateness of awarding damages for "personal humilia-
tion, embarrassment and mental distress" imposed as a result of the deprivation of
constitutional rights). See also Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir.
1978); Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882, 886 (1st Cir. 1976); Hos-
trop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579-80 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 829 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 1027 (1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634,
637 (7th Cir. 1974).
183. 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981).
184. Id. at 519.
185. 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981).
186. Id. at 1005.
187. 435 U.S. at 267 n.25.
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adopted a very stringent evidentiary standard, refusing to award any-
thing other than nominal damages based on plaintiff's own statement
of his emotional distress or psychological discomfort."' 8 Other courts
of appeals have taken a less restrictive approach, requiring no proof
of mental distress beyond the plaintiff's testimony. 89 Thus, the jury
is allowed to infer mental distress from the plaintiff's statements cou-
pled with proof of the surrounding circumstances. 190 While the court
in Carey failed to address this question, it did state that the "distress"
for which recovery is permissible may be evident by one's conduct
and observed by others.191 This language lends ample support to the
more liberal approach to this issue, an approach that has long been
used with regard to other tort actions.
188. See, e.g., Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1172-73 (7th Cir. 1981) (the
court reversed an award of damages for emotional and mental distress, concluding
that the evidence, consisting of isolated statements by various parties that they were
depressed, humiliated, and despondent, as a result of their termination based on polit-
ical affiliation, was insufficient to constitute proof of compensable mental or emo-
tional injury); Rosada v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (the court held that
$10,000 in damages for mental distress was excessive in light of the evidence which
showed that plaintiff at most felt pressure and embarrassment before his friends,
neighbors and family); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1978) (the
court disapproved of an award of more than nominal damages in an action by sus-
pended public school students because "the only evidence of actual injury was plain-
tiff's own statements that they experienced some psychological discomfort as a result
of their suspensions." The court implicitly required medical expert testimony to sub-
stantiate mental distress and explicitly required proof of "significant harm" to recover
for loss to reputation).
189. See, e.g., Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 519 (7th Cir. 1981) (the court re-
jected defendant's suggestion that the testimony of medical or psychiatric experts is
necessary to establish a compensable emotional injury, relying upon the language in
Carey v. Piphus, discussed infra note 191 and accompanying text); Halperin v. Kis-
singer, 606 F.2d 1192, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afdinpart, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (harm
may be demonstrated through "direct testimony of the plaintiffs or inferred from the
circumstances"); United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir.
1975) (the court upheld $1,000 compensatory damage award, stating that it required
no proof of mental distress beyond the plaintiffs testimony); Seaton v. Sky Realty
Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that compensatory damages
may be awarded for the humiliation suffered by plaintiffs "whether inferred from the
circumstances or established by testimony").
190. See supra note 189. In addition, lower courts in cases involving housing dis-
crimination, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 have similarly permitted inference of
compensable loss from surrounding circumstances and have sustained recoveries
based solely upon the plaintiffs testimony. See, e.g., Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp.
282 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Walker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
191. 435 U.S. at 264 n.20.
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The lower courts' varying approaches to the damage question illus-
trates the importance of seeking both presumed damages for viola-
tion of first amendment rights as well as compensatory damages for
proved mental anguish or emotional distress. As indicated, some
courts have rejected the presumed damage theory, while others have
imposed stringent evidentiary standards to recover for intangible
losses. In addition, it is impossible to determine which arguments
will be best received by a jury. On the other hand, the problem of
double recovery cannot be ignored. A jury should be advised that
presumed damages are limited to non-personal losses reflecting the
value of free speech generally in our society. If presumed damages
are awarded based on the perception that mental anguish is assumed
to flow from the deprivation of the right, an additional award for
proved emotional distress would be unjust. Through careful jury in-
structions, however, this problem may be avoided."'
C. Nominal Damagesfor Violation of First Amendment Rights
As a last resort, plaintiffs should always include a request for nomi-
nal damages. Even in the absence of an award of substantial com-
pensatory or presumed damages for violation of constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court in Carey stated that nominal damages should be
awarded for the purpose of declaring and vindicating legal rights,
regardless of proof of harm.'9 3 Although nominal damages, usually
in the sum of one dollar, are obviously insufficient to compensate for
constitutional wrongs, they remain an important vehicle for asserting
that rights have been violated and that the plaintiff has prevailed as a
matter of law.' 94 This finding is critical to alert municipalities of
wrongdoing and to sustain an award of attorney's fees pursuant to
192. Note that the common law precedents reflect the same limitation of pre-
sumed damages to nonpersonal, intangible losses. A few courts which have allowed
presumed damages in constitutional tort cases have followed this rule in restricting
coverage to the inherent loss caused by the first amendment violation. See Dellums v.
Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.C.
1974), modfied, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
193 435 U.S. at 266-67.
194. The court in Carey specified that the nominal damage award should not ex-
ceed the standard sum of $1.00. 435 U.S. at 267. Note that this standard is the one
followed in tort cases. See D. DoBns, supra note 166, at § 3.8. Several federal courts
have awarded nominal damages to vindicate the first amendment freedoms of speech
and association. See, e.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1978); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976); Schiff v. Williams,
519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act.'
Finally, in assessing the damages to be awarded in retaliation suits,
a jury should be instructed as to the basic functions served by section
1983. The law was passed in order to deter future governmental ac-
tion that violates civil rights, as well as to compensate the injured
party.196 When these purposes are achieved, the substantive constitu-
tional guarantee at stake is vindicated and the harmed party is made
whole.
Keeping in mind these goals, it is clear that nominal damages are
so insubstantial that they have no more than a symbolic effect. 197
Compensatory damages, for intangible losses such as emotional dis-
tress as well as damage to reputation, have thus far not proved to be
terribly effective in the civil rights area. A combination of strict stan-
dards of proof adopted by some courts of appeals coupled with a lack
of understanding on the part of juries as to the value of constitution-
ally protected interests has failed to ensure adequate compensation
for the infringement of these constitutionally protected intangible in-
terests.' 9 In addition, such compensatory damages have generally
been too insubstantial to provide a significant deterrent to violation
of first amendment rights. 9 9 The unavailability of punitive damages
against municipalities, which were used by common law courts to
achieve the objective of deterrence, further aggravates the prob-
lem.2"° This has led a few authorities to urge presumed damages as
the only way to accomplish the goals of the civil rights act: "An
award of presumed general damages provides effective vindication
and adequate compensation for the infringement of all constitution-
195. In a 1976 amendment, Congress authorized the court, in its discretion, to
award a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the cost to the prevailing party in an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). An award of nominal damages has
been held to qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party under the statute. See, e.g.,
Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1979); Harrington v. Vandalia-
Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979). A court in its discretion may still decline, however, to grant attorney's fees to
a plaintiff who has recovered no more than nominal damages. See, e.g., Huntley v.
Community School Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1978).
196. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. at 651-52; Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers.: Proposals to Strengthen the § 1983 Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers'
Misconduct, 87 YALn L.. 447, 451 (1978).
197. See Love, supra note 159, at 1281.
198. See supra note 188.
199. Love, supra note 159, at 1282.
200. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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ally protected interests, including those losses not readily subject to
evidentiary proof."''
Unfortunately too many courts have shown a reluctance to award
presumed damages, many of them erroneously relying on Carey to
support their position. 0 ' There is no reason why the injury to our
critical constitutional freedoms, as well as the intangible losses that
often flow from their invasion, should not be accorded the same
weight that judges and juries have given various tortious injuries.20 3
Otherwise, the dual purposes of section 1983--compensation and de-
terrence-will not be achieved.2 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, through its abandonment of the right-privi-
lege distinction, has in recent years recognized the importance of pro-
tecting the first amendment rights of government employees, while
simultaneously protecting the efficient and effective operation of gov-
ernment institutions. This article has sought to provide an analytic
framework for applying Supreme Court precedent that will give ade-
quate protection to the valuable first amendment interests at stake.
As suggested herein, the government should be required to prove that
its employee's speech was not critical to its employment decision or
that compelling justifications warranted the suppression of speech.20 5
201. Love, supra note 159, at 1282-83 (suggesting the need for legislation to set
specific presumed damage awards for violation of civil rights). 4ccord Newman,
supra note 196, at 465 (urging a liquid damage sum in addition to any actual dam-
ages); Note, Damage 4wardsfor Constitutional Torts: .4 Reconsideration .4fter Carey
v. Piphus, 93 HARv. L. REv. 966, 976-77 nn.68-69 (1980) (arguing the inadequacy of a
remedial scheme making recovery of damages contingent on proof of actual injury).
202. See supra note 162.
203. This analysis was suggested recently in Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th
Cir. 1979). "The hurt done to feelings and to reputation by an invasion of constitu-
tional rights is no less real and no less compensable than the cost of repairing a bro-
ken window pane or a damaged lock. Wounded psyche and soul are to be salved by
damages as much as the property that can be replaced at the local hardware store."
Id. at 1209.
204. See Newman, supra note 196, at 465. "Inadequate awards defeat both the
compensatory and deterrent objectives of a section 1983 damage suit. The lack of
adequate compensation not only provides paltry monetary incentive to sue but also
adds a final indignity to the denial of constitutional rights-the assessment by the
judge or jury that the victim's rights were not worth much anyway. And low awards,
whether borne by defendants or by their employers, obviously provide scant incentive
to refrain from similar abuses in the future." Id.
205. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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As to the issue of municipal liability, government should not be per-
mitted to escape responsibility through the assertion of respondeat
superior. The doctrine should be limited by recognizing that, in ef-
fect, official policy is created whenever officials in command render
personnel decisions.2" 6 Further, the concept of custom or usage
should be broadly interpreted to encompass both situations where a
series of wrongful retaliatory actions have been taken as well as the
situations where complaints to those in command fell on deaf ears.
Acquiescence or inaction should be deemed to constitute a "custom
or usage."2"7 Finally, on the question of damages in retaliation suits,
courts should recognize the concept of presumed damages for viola-
tion of first amendment rights.20 8 In addition, courts should begin to
award more liberal compensatory damages, recognizing the mental
anguish and emotional distress that is suffered by government em-
ployees subjected to unconstitutional retaliatory action.2 9 The adop-
tion of these recommendations would enhance the capacity of section
1983 to vindicate the critical first amendment rights at stake.
206. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
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